Chief of Station Congo Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone
In this vivid, authoritative account of being CIA station chief in Congo during the height of the Cold War, Devlin brings to life a harrowing tale of postcolonial political intrigue, covert violence and the day-to-day reality of being a key player in a global chess match between superpowers. Posted to Congo in 1960, Devlin quickly found himself at the swirling center of conflict— the Belgian colonial rulers had pulled out, the local strongmen had begun what would be a decades-long struggle for power and the Soviet Union was sending agents to influence events. Arriving on the scene with his wife and young daughter in tow, Devlin finds “central authority had broken down; there was no one in control who could prevent random acts of barbarity.” As the country begins to fall apart and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba starts flirting with the Soviets, orders come from Washington for “his removal.” Within weeks Lumumba is not only out of power but dead. While the rest of the book is full of exciting cloak-and-dagger derring-do and scrapes with death, it is this incident that haunts Devlin. He devotes the last chapter of the book to a point-by-point refutation of his or the agency’s involvement in Lumumba’s death. That alleged assassination is often used to illustrate the hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy. Devlin’s straightforward, plainly written approach to the task lends credence to his assertion of innocence. (Mar.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
User Ratings and Reviews
5 Stars One of the best CIA memoirs
Having read a handful or more of memoirs by former CIA operative or employees, I’ve learned that many of them can be quite dull or else poorly written. But Devlin’s book is far and away the best CIA memoir I’ve read. It focuses primarily on his tenure in the Congo, a tumultuous time. But the book is very eye opening to the role of a CIA man in an unstable country. The near-death experiences and the hair-raising stories are incredible. This is a great read, even for those who may not otherwise read this genre.
2 Stars A Bore of a Book By a Man Who Still Doesn’t get it
I waited to read this book with great anticipation. After all, the front cover has a recommendation by my hero, Seymour Hersh. Having read this book and other books on the CIA of that era, I now interpret Hersh’s “as good as it gets” differently. Like it or not, Mr. Devlin has lots of blood on his hands. He and his CIA colleagues got just about everything wrong and not only failed to protect our country but caused it great harm. No wonder no President (with the possible exception of Bush the Elder) has ever trusted the CIA.
4 Stars Keep In Context And Consider The Source
This memoir by the man who was CIA station chief at the birth of the modern Congo can spark reactions from repulsion to admiration for the man, his mission, and the many, many less-than-perfect players in the game at the time. Although any such work needs to be read with a grain of salt and full recognizance that the author isn’t about to destroy his own reputation, Devlin’s book is, I think, an accurate account of the events of the times.
His no-holds-barred discussion of Patrice Lumumba is bound to provoke cries of outrage in many circles, but Devlin is not alone in his assessment of the problems caused by the personal strengths, weaknesses, and ambitions of the martyred Congolese patriot.
I heartily recommend this book for the insights it offers into the wild times leading up to the Mobutu coup.
Dave Donelson, author of Heart of Diamonds: A Novel of Scandal, Love and Death in the Congo
5 Stars The Way It Was — Honest & Unvarnished
This is a great book of how one man can could make a difference in the Cold War. Author Devlin chose to concentrate on his time as the CIA Station Chief in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early and mid 1960s but one suspects that his earlier time as a case officer (in an unstated country) and later as station chief in Laos might be equally enlightening.
Devlin did his job to the best of his ability, acting always in the interest of the United States, and sometimes taking enormous risks with his career in the Agency and even his and his family’s personal safety. Unfortunately this is an example of a bygone era, probably never to be repeated since the Agency has become increasingly bureaucratic and bureaupathic over the years. Devlin enjoyed a great deal of latitude and authority, much more than is allowed today, recommending to Langley what should be done (and doing it either before or after approval) rather than to sit and wait on directives. Such behavior is unthinkable today, and as a result the CIA’s HUMINT is currently almost non-existent.
Having read the other reviews I was struck by several who criticized Devlin on political grounds, but it was Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and other various people above him who made policy rather than Devlin himself. He was simply extremely effective in carrying out their policies, and for that he should be commended rather than criticized. In addition, the times were much different in the 60s, and the Cold War was threatening to become hot in many locations. The UN was its usual ineffective self, and this book clearly points up the problems of attempting to depend on a toothless tiger to maintain order. Even worse, the UN frequently acts in opposition to American wishes as it did in this book.
American politicians, such as G. Mennon Williams, unknowledgable and dabbling in foreign affairs come off less than effective in Devlin’s work, as do many State Department officials.
Devlin’s main effort was to forestall Soviet expansion into Africa and the Congo rather than create a democracy in Zaire, and that must be kept in mind. He dealt with the Congolese as they were, not as how he would like them to be (ala Jimmy Carter.) His depictions of personalities, both favorable and unfavorable may offend many, but inconvenient truths are still truths.
Devlin recounts the problems with Patrice Lumumba and the various successor governments until the Mobutu coup and the civil war in the mid 1960s. The CIA was in the thick of it, advising but not controlling the Congolese politicians, and always attempting to keep the Sov Bloc nations out. How Devlin did this, and his successes and failures, make fascinating reading.
His motivation (as he states it) was to keep the cold war from becoming hot by frustrating communist expansionism and influence in non-communist countries.
This is a period piece illuminating the operational CIA at its best working to further American interests and safeguard the US from its enemies. During this period the Agency actively combatted Soviet thrusts on all fronts rather than merely supplying intelligence for actions by others. In many respects the Agency was the US’s first line of defense, often acting to make up for ineffective diplomatic initiatives, unknown and unappreciated by the American political establishment and the public. Read how it was done, and they ask yourself if you are willing to do what Devlin did in the future. It will take many Devlins to keep the US secure for our children. A whole lot more action than talk is necessary. Also note that Devlin was on duty 24-7 most of the time rather than 9-5. Like I said, it was a different age.
Buy and read this very well-written and interesting memoir by one who was there. It may be self-serving to some degree, but certainly less than most memoirs, and is worth a read by anyone interested in the CIA or US intelligence. John Le Carre could not have done better.
2 Stars Great personal experiences, but not the best wordsmith
It’s worth a read, however, I still felt like he left a lot of the inner workings of a CIA station unremarked. His personal dangers and bravery in the face of them are honorable and America should be grateful we had him to care for things in the Congo during that crucial time. However, I still feel unsatisfied with the book somehow, and it did drag in some places.
You must log in to post a comment.